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China’s White Paper on Peaceful
Development
Simone Dossi
State Council Information Office of the
People’s Republic of China, China’s
Peaceful Development, 6 September
2011, http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/
gqbps/2011/201109/t1000029.htm
China’s Peaceful Development joins the
growing number of white papers that the
Chinese government has published over
the past two decades on a variety of
issues. The aim of the document is to
explain the basic features of China’s devel-
opment strategy to foreign audiences, and
for this reason it was released in both
Chinese and English.
The first section of the white paper
(‘‘The Path of China’s Peaceful
Development: What it is About’’) defines
the concept of ‘‘peaceful development’’
(heping fazhan). It focuses on the circular
relationship between peace and develop-
ment: ‘‘China should develop itself through
upholding world peace, and contribute to
world peace through its own development’’.
From this perspective, China’s growth is
presented as an opportunity for ‘‘common
development’’ (gongtong fazhan). First, it
contributes to the economic prosperity of
other countries. China has made consider-
able efforts to counter the international
financial crisis and promote global eco-
nomic recovery. Second, China’s growth
contributes to international peace and secu-
rity. Here, the white paper emphasizes
China’s participation in UN peacekeeping
missions and in international counter-
piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.
The second section (‘‘What China Aims
to Achieve by Pursuing Peaceful
Development’’) outlines China’s develop-
ment goals for the next decades. By 2020
China will become a ‘‘society of higher-
level initial prosperity’’ (geng gao shuiping
de xiaokang shehui). By 2050 it will reach
the per capita GNP of the ‘‘medium devel-
oped countries’’ and further develop into a
‘‘rich, strong, democratic, civilized, harmo-
nious and modern socialist country’’
(fuqiang minzhu wenming hexie de shehuiz-
hui xiandaihua guojia).
The third section (‘‘China’s Foreign
Policies for Pursuing Peaceful
Development’’) recalls China’s ‘‘indepen-
dent foreign policy of peace’’ (duli zizhu
de heping waijiao zhengce), the grand strat-
egy adopted in 1982 at the 12th National
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Congress of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). The basic principles of that grand
strategy are reaffirmed in the white paper,
including the principle of non-alignment
(bujiemeng). The document also mentions
China’s ‘‘new security concept’’ (xin
anquan guan), first articulated in 1997
and based on ‘‘mutual trust, mutual bene-
fit, equality and coordination’’ (huxin, huli,
pingdeng, xiezuo).
The fourth section (‘‘China’s Path of
Peaceful Development is a Choice
Necessitated by History’’) associates peace-
ful development with China’s ‘‘basic
national conditions’’ and with the larger
‘‘global trend’’. Regarding the latter, the
white paper declares that ‘‘peace and devel-
opment’’ remain the major issues of inter-
national politics, as famously stated by
Deng Xiaoping in 1985.
Finally, the last section (‘‘What China’s
Peaceful Development Means to the Rest of
the World’’) argues that China’s peaceful
development breaks away from the ‘‘tradi-
tional pattern where a rising power was
bound to seek hegemony’’ (‘guo qiang bi
ba’ de daguo jueqi chuantong moshi).
The concept of peaceful development has
been the foundation of China’s public
diplomacy since 2005. Originally articu-
lated as ‘‘peaceful rise’’ (heping jueqi), as
proposed in 2003 by Zheng Bijian, an
influential ideologist and a former
Executive Vice President of the Central
Party School, the term met with strong crit-
icism within Beijing’s foreign policy com-
munity because ‘‘rise’’ might arouse
concerns among China’s neighbours.
The concept was thus reformulated as
‘‘peaceful development’’ and illustrated in
the 2005 white paper on ‘‘China’s
Peaceful Development Road’’.1
The reasons behind Beijing’s decision to
release a second white paper on the same
issue six years later are explained by Wang
Jisi, Dean of Peking University’s School of
International Studies. In an article in
Dangdai Shijie [Contemporary World], the
journal of the CCP International Liaison
Department, Wang notes that China’s rise
is increasingly drawing ‘‘doubts, misunder-
standings and slander’’ (zhiyi, wujie he
dihui) from the international community.
China should break this ‘‘cognitive iron
curtain’’ (renzhi tiemu) by clarifying its stra-
tegic intentions better.2 From this perspec-
tive, the white paper can be considered a
part of China’s new efforts to reassure its
neighbours.
In this respect, the 2011 edition of the
white paper also contains some interesting
novelties. Most notably, it provides a list of
China’s ‘‘core interests’’ (hexin liyi), an
expression that was often used cryptically
by Beijing in previous statements and docu-
ments. China’s core interests were already
listed by State Councillor Dai Bingguo
during the July 2009 US–China Strategic
and Economic Dialogue. Yet the 2011
white paper is the first official document
providing a list of what the Chinese govern-
ment considers its core interests: ‘‘state sov-
ereignty, national security, territorial
integrity and national reunification,
China’s political system established by the
Constitution and overall social stability,
1 SCIO, China’s Peaceful Development Road, 12 December 2005, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/
book/152684.htm
2Wang Jisi, ‘‘Nuli Xiaojie Guoji Shehui dui Zhongguo Heping Fazhan Daolu de Yilu¨’’ [Strive to Dissolve
the International Community’s Doubts about China’s Path of Peaceful Development], Dangdai Shijie 10
(2011), 1.
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and the basic safeguards for ensuring sus-
tainable economic and social development’’.
A second interesting innovation are the
two concepts of ‘‘convergence of interests’’
(liyi huihe dian) and ‘‘community of inter-
ests’’ (liyi gongtongti). Although not
explained in detail, they are meant to sug-
gest China’s commitment to stronger
international cooperation. Also introduced
by Zheng Bijian,3 these two concepts have
been referred to quite frequently in recent
times. They seem to be important ingredi-
ents of the foreign policy debate prior to the
18th CCP National Congress, and are well-
placed to become a part of China’s future
public diplomacy.
3 Zheng Bijian, ‘‘Dui yi ge Zhongda Zhanlu¨e Gouxiang de Xin Renshi’’ [A New Understanding of a Major
Strategic Concept], Beijing Ribao, 9 January 2012, 17.
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